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 Abstract:  This paper uses longitudinal data to perform tests of asymmetric 
information in the French automobile insurance market for the 1995-1997 period. 
This market is characterized by the presence of a regulated experience-rating 
scheme (bonus-malus). We demonstrate that the result of the test depends crucially 
on how the dynamic process between insurance claims and contract choice is 
modelled. We apply a Granger causality test controlling for the unobservables. We 
find evidence of moral hazard which we distinguish from adverse selection using a 
multivariate dynamic panel data model. Experience rating appears to lead high risk 
policyholders to choose contracts that involve less coverage over time. These 
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In France, automobile insurance pricing is based on two elements. The ﬁrst is a so-called
ap r i o r ipricing system which consists in constructing classes of homogeneous risks based
on the characteristics of policyholders. The second is an ap o s t e r i o r ipricing mechanism
or experience-rating scheme called bonus-malus, where past at-fault accidents are used
to adjust the premium in the next periods.
The insurance industry is fully committed to the application of the bonus-malus
scheme and this commitment is in fact enforced by a law stipulating that each insurer
must apply the same bonus-malus formula for similar driving histories according to rules
that cannot be renegotiated. Over the last decade, regimes of this sort have come under
criticism from the European Commission, on several grounds (Council of European
Communities, 1992; Picard, 2000). One speciﬁc criticism is that such pricing schemes
reduce competition among insurers. In its analysis, the Commission did not, however,
take into account the value of the scheme’s commitment to enforcing optimal incentive
contracts in the presence of asymmetric information.
Experience rating works at two levels. Since past accidents implicitly reﬂect unob-
servable characteristics of drivers (e.g. their driving skills) and introduce safe-driving
incentives, experience rating can help in responding directly to the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard which often disturb the insurance market’s allocation of risk.
(Dionne, 2001). To conﬁrm the need for such a multi-period scheme, we must prove the
existence of residual asymmetric information in single-period contracting. Puelz and
Snow (1994) tested for the presence of adverse selection in the portfolio of an American
insurer. Their idea was to take a risk proﬁle observable by the insurer and look for
a positive correlation between insurance claims and levels of insurance coverage. The
seminal theories of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1997) do strongly predict
that such a correlation should be observed in the data. Puelz and Snow (1994) concluded
that there was adverse selection in the contractual relationships they looked at. But the
same correlation between insurance coverage and claims can also be explained by moral
hazard or even heterogeneous risk aversion (Chiappori et al., 2004).
Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) have shown that the Puelz-Snow results
(1994) were probably derived from incomplete speciﬁcation of the econometric model.
These authors found no evidence of residual asymmetric information when testing for
non-linearities in insurance pricing with a model based on similar data from a Canadian
insurer. They also pointed out that heterogeneous risk aversion was captured by a
number of observable classiﬁcation variables. Chiappori and Salanié (2000) came to
the same conclusion concerning residual asymmetric information when looking at data
c o l l e c t e df r o mF r e n c hi n s u r e r so nt h ec l a i m sp o l i c y h o l d e r sﬁl e di n1 9 9 0 . N e e d l e s st o
say, this lack of evidence for the presence of residual asymmetric information in the
2automobile insurance market is somewhat puzzling. And especially it is so, seeing that
the insurance industry seems of the common opinion that the additional use of experience
rating for insurance pricing is crucial in responding to information problems. However,
it could be that moral hazard and adverse selection work in opposite directions when
no means are found to control for certain unobservable factors. Single-period data on
contracts may not provide suﬃcient instruments to separate the two problems.
Studies by Chiappori (2000) and Chiappori and Salanié (2000) have clearly shown
that tests using the Puelz-Snow methodology (1994) fail to distinguish between ad-
verse selection and moral hazard. Such tests give only a global view of the presence of
asymmetric information. Experience rating, by contrast, not only provides additional
information on risk classiﬁcation but may also play an important role in the dynamic
relationship between policyholders’ insurance claims and contract choice (Dionne, 2001).
The theoretical literature clearly indicates that these features may help overcome prob-
lems of moral hazard when risks known to the policyholder (endogenous) are unobserv-
able by the insurer (Winter, 2000).
In France, contract choice is inﬂuenced by the evolution of the premium which, by
law, is itself closely linked to the policyholder’s driving record. Since increased insurance
coverage tends to lower the expected costs of accidents, incentives for safe driving is
weakened for all risks. Under experience rating, the subsequent rise in accidents increases
the marginal costs of future accidents. Hence, experience rating may help in correcting
the disincentive eﬀect created by single-period insurance coverage. Since results obtained
by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) can be interpreted as evidence that there is no residual
asymmetric information problem in the French automobile insurance market, the beneﬁts
of experience rating mitigating moral hazard can also be called into question. However,
these tests were conducted in a static framework which fails to recognize the dynamics
that experience rating and semi-commitment introduce into contractual relationships.
A b b r i n ge ta l . ( 2 0 0 3 a )h a v em a d ear e c e n ta t t e m p tt oa p p l yt h i sm u l t i - p e r i o di n -
centive mechanism, by focusing on the dynamics of claims but not on the dynamics of
contract choice (because of data limitations). Applying speciﬁc assumptions about the
wealth eﬀects of accidents to policyholders who diﬀer only in their claims record (thus
their experience rating), their model predictst h a ts u b j e c t sw i t ht h ew o r s tc l a i m sr e c o r d s
should try harder to drive safely and thereby, ceteris paribus, ﬁle fewer claims. Yet, their
data do not support the presence of moral hazard. After all, the puzzle identiﬁed by
Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) remains un-
solved. Does no residual asymmetric information mean no residual moral hazard and
no residual adverse selection?
In this paper, we shall show that failure to detect residual asymmetric information
and, more speciﬁcally, moral hazard in insurance data and, potentially, in other data
3sets, is due to the failure of previous econometric approaches to model adequately the
dynamic relationship between contract choice and claims when looking at experience
rating. Using a unique longitudinal survey of policyholders from France, we show that,
as anticipated by Chiappori and Salanié (2000), omission of the experience-rating vari-
able most plausibly explains the failure to detect asymmetric information in tests similar
to the one they applied. The bonus-malus coeﬃcient is, indeed, negatively related to
the level of insurance coverage (through ﬂuctuations in the premium) and positively cor-
related to claims (potentially through unobserved heterogeneity). The coeﬃcient thus
appears to hide the link between claims and contract choice which is exactly what Chi-
appori and Salanié (2000) had in mind. This is apparent in traditional cross-sectional
tests as well as in extrapolations using longitudinal data models that simply pool re-
peated observations or permit the correlation of unobserved independent factors with
each contract observed over time. For our data set, these factors essentially improve the
power of the test to detect asymmetric information.
This paper also proposes a methodology to disentangle the historical pathways which
lead asymmetric information to a conditional correlation between claims and levels of
coverage. Within a longitudinal data framework controlling for unobservables (Chamber-
lain, 1984), we show how Granger causality (Granger, 1969) can be used to disentangle
moral hazard from adverse selection. We argue that this test is the most appropri-
ate in insurance markets characterized by semi-commitment, where full anticipation of
long-run behavior is not optimal.
We ﬁnd evidence of Granger causality linking insurance coverage with accident rates
in following years and this points to the presence of moral hazard. After ﬁling at-fault
claims or receiving premium increases, policyholders reduce their level of coverage and
try harder to substantially reduce their likelihood of ﬁling any future claims. In our data
set, a switch from all-risk coverage (costs covered for both parties) to limited coverage
(only third-party costs) is associated with a substantial 6% decline in the probability a
claim will be ﬁled.
We also ﬁnd that there is no presence of residual contemporaneous asymmetric infor-
mation in the data. From our results, it appears that a priori classiﬁcation can account
for the unobservable risk characteristics of policyholders if insurers have access to expe-
rience rating as an additional source of information in assessing the risk proﬁles of their
clients. Indeed, we ﬁn dt h a tt h ec h a n g ei nc o n t r a c ti sm o s to f t e nt r i g g e r e db yar i s i n g
experience rating coeﬃcient.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present key features of the French
automobile insurance market and discuss important issues regarding the regulatory con-
text within which tests of asymmetric information are made. In section 3, we present
the data used in our analysis and examine their main features. In section 4, we repli-
4cate methodologies similar to those of Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al.
(2001) for each cross-section but also for the panel data examining the eﬀect of omitted
variables, (especially experience rating) on test conclusions. In section 5, we perform
Granger causality test for moral hazard and adverse selection. Section 6 concludes.
2 The French Automobile Insurance Market
To understand how one can study empirically asymmetric information in the French au-
tomobile insurance market, it is important to start with a description of the institutional
setting peculiar to France.1
Exclusivity and Semi-commitment – There is no clause in insurance contracts
“forcing” drivers to stay with the same insurance company once the contractual period
is over or even during a contractual period. However, there is some exclusivity written
into insurance contracts, in that a policyholder cannot have contracts with diﬀerent
insurers to insure the same risk in a given period. Hence, only semi-commitment is
possible in this market. It is not optimal for a policyholder to commit to multiperiod
arrangements with one insurer, since there is the possibility of renegotiating contracts
and switching insurer. This is common to many insurance markets. (On the notion of
commitment, see Dionne and Doherty, 1994, and Hendel and Lizzeri, 2003).
Experience Rating Law – According to the regulations in force in France (Article A
121-1 - Automobile insurance - Reduction-Incr e a s ec l a u s eo ft h eF r e n c hI n s u r a n c eC o d e
and its appendix), the premium charged to the policyholder is necessarily determined
by multiplying the amount of the a priori premium by a so-called reduction-increase
coeﬃcient.2 T h eb a s ec o e ﬃcient is 1. After each year of accident-free insurance coverage,
the coeﬃcient applied is that of the preceding contract period minus 5%. Each at-fault
accident occurring within the insurance year will increase the coeﬃcient by 25%. The
clause also stipulates that there will be no increase for the ﬁrst accident occurring after
a period of at least three years during which the bonus-malus coeﬃcient was equal to
0.50.
Public Information on Accidents –A t - f a u l tc l a i m sﬁled by drivers fall into the
domain of public information to which rival companies have free access. Bonus-malus
information must be reported when the subscriber purchases a new insurance contract.
1See Richaudeau (1998), Picard (2000), Dionne (2001), and Fombaron (2002) for a detailed descrip-
tion of the automobile insurance market in France and Pinquet (1999) for an analysis of the experience
rating.
2Throughout this paper, this coeﬃcient will be referred to as the bonus-malus coeﬃcient, meaning
that it counts as a bonus when less than 1 but as a malus when more than 1.
5Moreover, since experience rating is enforced by law, the industry is fully committed to
application of the bonus-malus scheme.
This commitment on the part of insurers is crucial. Theoretical studies have
shown that, failing commitment on the insurer’s part, the bonus-malus scheme will pro-
vide no incentive whatsoever (Chiappori et al., 1994). Similarly, any beneﬁts from the
bonus-malus will be eliminated if a particular insurance company acquires an informa-
tional edge from access to private data on its clients’ accidents. Drivers will then choose
another insurer when the malus increases (Kunreuther and Pauly, 1985; Dionne and
Doherty, 1994; Fombaron, 1997). Finally, evidence seems to show that there is full
competition among insurers regarding the a priori pricing of insurance.
Types of Insurance Coverage – Two types of insurance coverage predominate: all-
risk insurance (tous risques) and third-party liability (responsabilité civile). The former
insures against losses incurred by both the policyholder and the third-party, whereas
the latter, as its name indicates, insures only against third-party losses. At minimum,
the law prescribes that a policyholder must have a limited third-party insurance policy.
Chiappori and Salanié (2000) report an average annual premium of 3000 Francs (1986
Francs) for this coverage, whereas the premium for all-risk insurance coverage costs
twice as much and increases with the value of the vehicle. Hence, the choice of insurance
coverage is an important decision for policyholders.
To summarize, the institutional setting of the French automobile insurance mar-
ket corresponds to dynamic models characterized by renegotiation and semi-commitment.
As already argued, this setting introduces testable predictions of the eﬀects of asym-
metric information on contractual relationships. In such a setting, where insurers are
committed and the policyholder’s driving record is public information, the experience
rating scheme can be expected to promote safe driving and to serve as a useful tool in
classifying the riskiness of drivers.
3 The SOFRES Longitudinal Survey
The SOFRES longitudinal survey covers a representative sample of French drivers from
1995 to 1997 (3 years).3 The information available in the database is composed of three
elements. The ﬁrst concerns information on driver characteristics (sex, age, number of
accidents). The second covers the vehicles (year, group, etc.). The third and most impor-
tant element for the problem we are studying relates to insurance contracts. It provides
the bonus-malus coeﬃcient and the type of insurance coverage. These two variables rep-
resent a very good proxy for actual insurance contract characteristics. Unfortunately,
3See chapter 6 of Dahchour (2002) for a detailed description of the database.
6information on other characteristics of the contract is very limited, containing nothing
about insurance premiums or deductibles, let alone anything about the identity of the
insurer from year to year. Though ideally, one would prefer to have such information,
the choice between “all-risk” insurance or “third-party” is likely to be the most impor-
tant decision for the policyholder. In fact, the level of deductible seems mainly related
to the value of the vehicle.
Our ﬁnal sample is thus a three-year incomplete panel (1995-1997). We deﬁne an
observational unit as a policyholder along with a vehicle deﬁned by the ﬁrst 4 digits
of its license number plus the year the car was manufactured.4 A policyholder is not
necessarily present in each year. Indeed, many contracts are observed for less than three
years. Table 1 gives the structure of the panel, with its entries and exits.
[Table 1 about here]
Using surveys based on policyholder records has two main advantages. The ﬁrst is
that, since attrition is presumably much less problematic than with insurers’ portfolios,
the representability of the panel might be expected to remain constant over time. In
the case of data provided by insurers, the reason prompting a policyholder to switch
insurers might well be the changing terms of his contract, which is precisely the subject
under investigation in this literature. In our case, although we cannot observe the
identity of the insurer, we do not lose track of contracts that are switched so long as the
policyholder keeps the same vehicle. Therefore, no observational unit need be censored
because drivers change insurers. However, if the decision to change a vehicle is correlated
with changes in contract parameters, then there might still be an attrition bias. (We
look into that possibility in Section 4 but fail to conﬁrm that suspicion.) Furthermore,
we use entrants in 1996 and 1997 to maintain the representability of the sample, thus
limiting any loss in eﬃciency as the yearly sample sizes decrease.
The second advantage relates to the observability of both claimed and unclaimed
accidents, one which provides a window for the analysis of reporting behavior. Since
the contract party reporting accidents is the policyholder, both unclaimed and claimed
accidents involving material damage and injuries are reported. Although this is not
the primary concern of the present investigation, the availability of such information is
precious, because it leads to a better interpretation of the results, making it possible to
separate a drop in accidents from the underreporting of claims.
4In constructing the panel we had to match vehicles with policyholders drawn from diﬀerent ﬁles
for each year. We merged policyholder IDs with a car identiﬁer consisting of the ﬁrst 4 digits of the
automobile identiﬁcation number plus the year in which it was manufactured. This produced a match
quality which minimized the possibility of matching errors while allowing us to trace contracts across
years. In what follows, we use the term contract to denote an observational unit.
73.1 Contract Characteristics
The SOFRES survey provides relatively rich source of information to classify policy-
holders and their vehicle. This is highly important for the empirical investigation of
asymmetric information, because the econometrician must try to replicate what the in-
surer can know about the policyholder’s risk in order to price insurance. A subset of the
contract characteristics that we use are described in Table 2 for 1995. These have been
documented elsewhere to be fairly representative of the risk classiﬁcation variables that
insurers use for ap r i o r iclassiﬁcation (see Dahchour, 2002 chap. 2).
[Table 2 about here]
It should be noted that the panel is generally representative of French drivers al-
though young drivers are underepresented. This can be explained by the fact that young
drivers are often included on their parents’ insurance policies, as occasional drivers. In-
deed, 45.2% of 1995 contracts feature the presence of occasional users. Policyholders
have, on average, 25 years of experience and relatively few have less than 2 years of
experience. Regional and socio-economic status (SES) is fairly representative of the
population. Policyholders mostly use city and highway networks, although a small pro-
portion use rural networks. More than half of the respondents have more than one
vehicle; one-third of the vehicles being less than three years old. Yet, a sizeable propor-
tion of vehicles are older than ﬁve years.
3.2 Bonus-Malus, Accidents and Insurance Coverage
The evolution of the key variables used to study the dynamics in insurance contract
choices and accidents is given in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here]
The percentage of policyholders reporting at least one claim in a given year is 12.6% in
1995. Undeclared accidents are much less frequent. An estimated 7.8% of policyholders
did not report an accident in 1995 and this relative frequency decreases to 5% in 1997.
The bonus-malus is the coeﬃcient applicable at the beginning of the contractual year.
Therefore, it does not take into account claims in the current year. Nearly two-thirds
of policyholders have a maximal bonus (or minimal bonus-malus) coeﬃcient while very
few have one in excess of 1. Indeed, the law prescribes that a policyholder cannot have
a bonus-malus in excess of unity after three years without at-fault claims.
The mean exposure to risk, measured by the number of kilometers the vehicle was
used, does not change over the period. On average policyholders report driving their
8vehicle about 13,700 km per year, while three quarters of policyholders use their vehicle
less than 18,000 km per year. Finally, more than two-thirds (69%) of the contracts
observed are all-risk insurance contracts.
Before proceeding with tests for residual asymmetric information in this insurance
market, we ﬁrst document correlation and dependence patterns among the main variables
of interest. In Table 4, we look at how the distribution of claims varies by type of
insurance coverage.
[Table 4 about here]
A ﬁrst observation is that there are very few contracts which feature multiple claims
within a year. The relative frequencies show that types of contracts and claims do
not appear to be unconditionally independent of the number of claims (Chi-square =
79.2, p-value<0.001). Those with all-risk coverage tend to ﬁle more claims. All-risk
policyholders have a 4.6% higher claim incidence than do those with third-party coverage.
We should stress that this is not an indication of asymmetric information in contrac-
tual relationships as Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) noted. Insurers gather
information on policyholders so as to price their policies diﬀerentially, with an actuarial
fairness that restores an eﬃcient allocation of risk. Therefore, one must look within a
risk class, as deﬁned by the characteristics insurers can observe in policyholders (for ex-
ample those in Table 2), to see whether or not there is any correlation between contract
choice and claims (Crocker and Snow, 1986). We shall perform such an exercise in the
next section.
To get a better understanding of how contract choices, experience rating, exposure to
risk (mileage), and the decision to ﬁle a claim interact, we can look at rough correlations
among these variables. In Table 5, bivariate correlations are reported.
[Table 5 about here]
These correlations and the information in Table 4 tend to illustrate the three main
points made about the bonus-malus by many observers. (See Picard (2000) for an
analysis of deregulation in Europe).
First, it is believed that experience-rating schemes lead to inﬂation of ap r i o r ipre-
miums for drivers with a limited or poor driving history. Some insurers may indeed take
advantage of the experience rating regulation to manipulate ap r i o r ipricing based on the
evolution of the bonus-malus.5 In Table 5, the correlation between the bonus-malus and
5Some evidence is provided in an experiment performed by the magazine Que Choisir (November,
1998). For identical individuals who only diﬀered in their bonus-malus coeﬃcient, there was considerable
heterogeneity in the premium oﬀered across insurance companies, over and above what is mandated by
a posteriori pricing, suggesting that the bonus malus may also be used in ap r i o r ipricing.
9contract choice (coverage where 1 is for all-risk coverage) is negative and strongly sig-
niﬁcant. However, the bonus-malus is positively correlated to claims, plausibly through
non-observable heterogeneity.
Second, one of the common characteristic of these schemes is that they penalize
less than reward, resulting in some sort of “forced” risk pooling at the lowest-end of
the experience-rating distribution. From Table 4, we see that more than two-thirds of
policyholders are at the lower end of the distribution. Very few policyholders have a
bonus-malus above 1. It is thus diﬃcult, for low risks with the best records, to separate
themselves from high risks with similar experience-rating coeﬃcients. Over and above
what is prescribed by law, some insurers may even use speciﬁc rebates that reduce the
“eﬀective” bonus-malus coeﬃcient to its lowest limit of 0.5.6
Third, since the penalty for a claim where the driver is at fault does not take into
account of the size of the claim, small claims that would otherwise be reported may not
be under experience rating and this adds to the possibility of cross-subsidization. We get
a glimpse of this from Table 5 if we take the correlation between undeclared accidents
and the bonus-malus. The correlation is positive and statistically signiﬁcant indicating
that those with a higher bonus-malus may tend to refrain from ﬁling a claim.
In summary, all these stylized observations tend to suggest that experience-rating
schemes introduce dynamic mechanisms, where contract choice and claims depend on
the evolution of experience-rating coeﬃcients which in turn depend on the past decisions
of the contractual parties. There appears to be a somewhat “dangerous” triangular
correlation between claims, contract choice, and the experience-rating coeﬃcient. This
can confuse the correlation between claims and contract choice within risk proﬁles, a
correlation which is crucial for testing asymmetric information, as we shall see in the
next section.
4 Presence of Asymmetric Information
4.1 Cross-Sectional Data Test
Based on a traditional conditional independence test, one can use a cross-section of pol-
icyholders along with their characteristics to test whether those with high unobservable
risk have more coverage. If there is asymmetric information in a contractual relation-
ship then, within a risk class summarized by a vector of the policyholder’s characteristics
which are observable to both parties, xi, the residual unobserved variation in risk and
contract choice should be correlated. This is a robust prediction from the adverse se-
6Some analysts even argue that the eﬀective coeﬃcient might be below 0.5.
10lection and/or moral hazard literature, as applicable to the setting described in the
introduction. As already discussed, such single period tests are designed to detect the
presence of residual asymmetric information, since they cannot disentangle moral hazard
from adverse selection.
Denote by di the contract choice of policyholder i and ni the number of claims. Then,
conditional independence holds under
H0 : F(di|xi,n i;θd)=F(di|xi;θd) (1)
given θd is some ﬁnite-dimensional parameters vector and F is the cumulative dis-
tribution function (cdf) of di conditional on xi. Relation (1) means that the number
of claims does not give information on the distribution of contract choice (Dionne et
al., 2001). In other words, under the null, there is no residual asymmetric information
within a risk class and contract choice does not correlate with claims. If, however, high-
risk policyholders would choose more coverage than low risk policyholders under adverse
selection or if individuals with more insurance coverage would be less motivated to drive
carefully under moral hazard, then a positive correlation should be observed.
A non-parametric test will handle the dreaded dimensionality problem. The vector
xi must be rich enough to represent the insurer’s information set and the data require-
ments for generating ﬁxed power to reject the null of conditional independence will grow
exponentially. In this paper, we opt for a parametric form of the test where
di = I(x
0
iβd + πnni + udi > 0). (2)
The error term udi follows a distribution that we will assume to be normal but which
could also be logistic with some rescaling.7 I(.) is the indicator function (I(a)=1if a is
true, 0 otherwise) that denotes the choice of a certain insurance coverage (1 is for all-risk
coverage). This could be extended to other typ e so fd i s c r e t eo rc o n t i n u o u sc h o i c es e t s
but available data will generally force a particular choice. In our case, we only observe
a binary variable for insurance contracts, so we consider a class of binary-choice models.
A test for asymmetric information using this parametric model is given by πn =0
under the null hypothesis of conditional independence and is implemented by estimating
(2) on a cross section of N contracts {di,n i,xi}
N
i=1.
Implicit in (1) is that the model is correctly speciﬁed. But, as Dionne, Gouriéroux,
and Vanasse (2001) emphasize, care must be given to the speciﬁcation of the index
x0
iβd. Indeed, it must reﬂect the insurer’s knowledge of thed r i v e r ’ ss i t u a t i o na tt h et i m e
where the contract is negotiated. We use combinations of dummy variables (age, socio-
economic status, income, region, road network used, car type, fuel type, number of active
7We investigate the possibility of faulty speciﬁcation of such a distribution in the next section.
11drivers) in addition to continuous variables such as the car’s manufacture date and the
driver’s experience. For these variables, we use spline functions with nodes at natural
points, given the distribution of the data.8 So, these constitute ﬂexible approximations
to non-linear functions. This is highly important as Chiappori and Salanié (2000) show;
even for very simple utility functions, the optimal pricing policy can be quite non-linear.9
Note that, for now, we make no room for using the bonus-malus coeﬃcient in ap r i o r i
pricing. Hence, we assume that insurers will follow regulations and not use experience
rating to classify policyholders ex-ante.
The database also contains data on mileage for the current year. However, the use
of such a variable is problematic: no assumption can be made concerning its evolution
d u r i n gt h ec o n t r a c ty e a rn o rc a ni tb eo b s e r v e db yt h ei n s u r e rw h e nt h ec o n t r a c ti s
negotiated. Clearly, claims can aﬀect kilometers in the current year. The potential bias
resulting from a correlation between the unobservables of contract choice and mileage
can aﬀect the claim coeﬃcient being tested. Insurers use some proxy for kilometers in
their risk classiﬁcation. For now, we shall report results with and without mileage.
Based on the three years of data, Table 6 reports the results for each year with and
without mileage spline variables. Most of the risk-classiﬁcation controls in the table
take the anticipated signs (see Appendix A for complete results), while the pseudo R-
square varies between 0.35 to 0.38. Results for 1995 and 1997 suggest that we should not
reject conditional independence at the 5% level (t0.05=1.96) and hence conclude for the
absence of asymmetric information for both speciﬁcations with and without mileage.
For 1996, the conclusion depends on the inclusion of the mileage variable. Without
this variable there seems to be enough evidence to reject the null. However, once the
mileage variable is introduced, there seems to be less evidence against the absence of
asymmetric information. The mileage variable is informative about contract choices.
This can be seen from comparisons of the likelihoods. For 1996 and 1997, we can
reject the restrictions that the four mileage splines included do not provide information
about contract choice (χ2(4) =19.6 (21.8) for 1996 (1997)) . The causality’s direction is
however uncertain. Usage can change as a result of contract change or change in planned
usage can encourage the policyholder to modify insurance coverage. Furthermore, a
simultaneity bias can lead to a bias in the claim coeﬃcient. This variable obviously
does not belong in the insurer’s information set when negotiation takes place. Since
conclusions across years are ambiguous, we perform some robustness checks to see if a
8For a continuous variable z,t h em spline denoted zm with lower node at ψm−1 and ψm will be
given by zm =m a x ( m i n ( z − ψm−1,ψm − ψm−1),0). In a linear regression of y on z1,...,zM,t h es l o p e
for zm measures the local slope on the segment (ψm−1,ψm). We also experimented with combinations
of splines and binary indicators which did not change results (available upon request).
9We experimented with limited interactions among variables to the extent that the data provides
enough variation (involving additional variation in contract choice) to identify their eﬀect.
12more stable pattern could emerge.
[Table 6 about here]
4.2 Robustness Tests
4.2.1 False speciﬁcation of Functional Form
The ﬁrst check is designed to verify if the rejection of the hypothesis for 1996 is robust
to false speciﬁcation of the functional form of the conditional mean whose general form
can be written as E(di|xi,n i)=F(h(x,n i)).T h e ﬁrst object that can be incorrectly
speciﬁed is the index h(xi,n i) inside the distribution function. As proposed by Dionne,
Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001), we can include best predictor insurers’ of drivers’ claims
in the conditional mean of (2) to see whether any non-linearities and interactions have
escaped the speciﬁcation used in Table 6.
To do so, we estimate, in a ﬁrst-step, the negative binomial model for the number
of claims in each year, using the same set of risk factors as in the test (since there are
no plausible exclusion restrictions).10 We then use estimated parameters to generate a
prediction for each year. This prediction is included along with actual claims in the
index of (2). The identiﬁcation of this eﬀect will come entirely through the exponential
structure of the prediction. Table 7 reports results for 1995-1997 where we do not include
the mileage variable.11
[Table 7 about here]
Contrary to the ﬁndings of Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse, the conclusion of the
test does not appear to depend on the functional form of the index. For 1995, the
inclusion of this variable actually helps into increasing the estimate of the parameter on
the claim coeﬃcient but does not aﬀect the conclusion. The conclusion of the test for
1996 and 1997 does not change also. One explanation of this negative result may be
that our data set is limited; we do not have access to all insurers’ contract variables as
did Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) for a single insurer.
10Denote by µit =e x p ( x0
iπ) the conditional mean of a Poisson distribution of ni. Then it holds true
that Va r(ni|xi)=E(ni|xi) which is usually rejected by the data, the so-called equivariance property.
One can assume that µ∗
it is given by exp(x0
iπ + νi) and assume that νi follows a gamma distribution
with parameters (δ,δ). This relaxes the equivariance property, since the mixing distribution yields a
negative binomial distribution for n (Gouriéroux, Monfort, Trognon, 1984).
11In results not reported here, the inclusion of the mileage variable does not change the qualitative
results of this robustness check. Results available upon request.
13Since the incorrect speciﬁcation of F(·) is as problematic as that of h(·),w ea l s o
test for normality using the test proposed by Chesher and Irish (1987).12 Interestingly,
we cannot reject normality at conventional levels for all the three years (χ2= 1995:10.8,
1996:19.8, 1997:24.1 ;χ2
46,0.95=31.4). We also experimented with exponential forms of
heteroscedasticity by modelling Va r(udi|zi)=e x p ( z0
iφ) for some vector of characteristics
zi , but this did not alter the results. All standard errors calculated in Table 6 and 7
are robust to unknown forms of heteroscedasticity.
Therefore, we conclude that the rejection for 1996 does not appear to come from a
faulty speciﬁcation of the functional form.
4.2.2 Omitted Variables
A second check is made to see whether there is not an omitted variable which hides
the link between claims and contract choice. Indeed, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) note
after ﬁnding that drivers with a maximal bonus (0.5) tend to buy more comprehensive
coverage:
“In fact, as our ﬁnal result on the eﬀe c to ft h eb o n u sc o e ﬃcient clearly sug-
gests, it may be the case that some variable that is observed by the insurers
but somehow is not recorded in our data inﬂuences contract choice and risk-
iness in opposite directions, and that it cancels out a conditional dependence
in our estimates.”( p . 7 2 )
What the correlations in Table 5 suggest is that the bonus-malus coeﬃcient itself
meets this criterion exactly: correlated negatively with contract choice and positively
correlated with claims. Table 8 presents the same tests as in Table 7 where we add as
a regressor a dummy for whether the driver has a minimum coeﬃcient of 0.5 plus the
coeﬃcient itself to measure the correlation when the coeﬃcient is above 0.5. This can
capture the eﬀect of speciﬁc rules embodied in the bonus-malus regulation or speciﬁc
pricing techniques that can be used to attract low risks.
12Denote by λ(z0
ib θ) the hazard of the standard normal distribution at z0
ib θ, φ(z0
ib θ)/(1−Φ(z0
ib θ)). φ and
Φ are the standard normal pdf and cdf and z contains all k regressors used in Table 7 while b θ is the
corresponding maximum likelihood estimator of the parameter vector under the null of normality. Then,
a conditional moment test is given by LM = ι0R(R0R)−1R0ι.Ris the matrix of scores, a N × (K +3 )






The scores are given by b e1
i = −(1 − di) λ(z0
ib θ)+diλ(−z0
ib θ) , b e2
i = −(z0
ib θ)b e1
i (dropped if z contains a
constant), b er
i =( r +( z0
ib θ)r)b e1
i for r =3 ,4.T h i si sd i s t r i b u t e da sχ2(k +3 )under the null of normality
(Chesher and Irish, 1987).
14[Table 8 about here]
Indeed, the parameter for the number of claims increases signiﬁcantly for all three
years while the precision of the estimates remain constant. We now reject the absence of
asymmetric information for 1995 at a level higher than 10% and furthermore, even with
a smaller number of observations in comparison to 1996 and 1995, the coeﬃcient for
1997 jumped. The bonus-malus parameters are quite informative about contract choice
(Chi-square (2) = 41.8 (1995), 50.4 (1996), 39.8 (1997)). Although it is still too soon to
speak of causal eﬀects at this point, the strong association between the bonus-malus and
contract choice does form a stronger correlation between claims and contract choices.
Since longitudinal data are available, we now extend these tests in that direction.
4.3 Longitudinal Data Tests
The risk classiﬁcation parameters remain relatively stable across years. A Chi-square test
for the restriction that parameters should remain stable across years in a pooled probit
with errors clustered at the contract level yields a value of 104.2 and a p-value of 0.182.
We can therefore impose this parametric restriction and pursue a panel data analysis
with invariant parameters. As pointed out in Arulampalam (1999), the parameters in
pooled and error component probits (random eﬀect) have a direct correspondence but
the error component probit allows us to identify the share of unobserved heterogeneity
in the total variance of the error term.13 If there exist contract-speciﬁc attributes that
are constant over time but independent of observable risk classiﬁcation, this will lead
to serial correlation across years. Enforcing parameter restrictions across time and also
allowing for serial correlation in this way can improve the eﬃciency of the estimator. We
perform the Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001) ﬁrst-step estimate using a negative
binomial model with beta random eﬀects in the dispersion parameter14 (Hausman et al.,
1984). We also make predictions from the cross-sectional negative binomial estimates.
Table 9 reports the pooled probit estimates for the Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse test
(including the bonus-malus coeﬃcient), along with the share of unobserved heterogeneity
in contract choice from the error component probit.
[Table 9 about here]
13Deﬁne udit = αdi + εdit such that if αdi and εdit are independent of each other and normally
d i s t r i b u t e dw i t hv a r i a n c e sσ2
ε and σ2





α) while the error component probit estimate will be πn/σε. Therefore, one must multiply
the error component probit estimate by
p
(1 − ρ) where ρ = σ2
α/(σ2
ε +σ2
α) in order to get pooled probit
estimates.
14The negative binomial random eﬀect model allows δ, the overdispersion parameter, to vary across
contracts by assuming that it follows a beta distribution.
15We obtain a suﬃcient increase in precision, with no signiﬁcant variation in the size of
parameters. We can easily reject the conditional independence assumption and conclude
for some evidence of residual asymmetric information. However, we do not know the
source of this correlation, whether it is adverse selection or moral hazard.
Since the attrition rate in the panel is high, we ﬁrst verify if those leaving have a
diﬀerent conditional relationship between claims and contract choice. Those leaving the
panel in a particular year may possibly be those who are faced with increasing premiums.
In this case, these should be the contracts most probably scheduled for revision of terms
in the last observed year. Consequently, there should be a stronger association between
claims and contract choice for these contracts than for those remaining in the panel. We
test this idea by comparing estimates from the unbalanced sample containing those who
leave and remain and the balanced sample containing only those who remain. Under
the null of attrition that does not bias the inference supporting the relationship between
contract choice and claims, the estimator b θu, for the unbalanced sample, should be
asymptotically eﬃcient while b θb , the balanced sample estimator, should not be eﬃcient
for all parameters in the conditional independence test (see Nijman and Verbeek, 1996):
Va r(b θb − b θu)=Va r(b θb) − Va r(b θu) . We can use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (see
Hausman, 1978) that should be Chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom dim(θ)
under the null of H0 : b θb−b θu =0 .15 Under non-random attrition these estimates should
diﬀer considerably. The test applied to the speciﬁcation in column 1 of Table 9 yields
a value of 44.78 which has a p-value of 0.644. It thus ﬁnds no evidence of an attrition
bias. Note that, as this test may not be powerful enough, we also rely on another test
proposed by Fitzgerald et al. (2000) to check for the possibility of a bias due to attrition.
If the probability of attrition depends on past accidents and past contract choices, then
whether or not a contract exits or remains in the panel should be correlated with initial
contract choice and initial claims. We can estimate the following model
di1 = I(x
0
i1βd + πnni1 + πaai + π
a
nni1ai + udi1 > 0)
where ai = I(Ti < 3) and Ti is the number of years in which a contract is observed.
The null hypothesis should therefore be that where both πa
n and πa are zero. This test
performed on the speciﬁcation used in the ﬁrst column of Table 9 yields the following
relationship (t-values in brackets):






ni1ai + udi1 > 0)
N =1 1 ,808; χ
2(2) = 1.26
This test leads to a conclusion similar to that of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. There
appears to be no evidence of an attrition bias. Indeed, with a survey of policyholders,
15The test statistic is W =( b θb −b θu)0Va r(b θb −b θu)−1(b θb −b θu).
16attrition is presumably much less problematic than when using data from insurers where
a change in contract parameters may lead policyholders to switch insurer. Furthermore,
with the conditional independence test which controls for a long list of characteristics
we are less likely to face the risk of retention based on unobservables.
4.4 Summary of Conditional Independence Tests
Results from this section can be summarized as follows: Experience rating plays a con-
founding role in our attempts to study the conditional correlation between contract
choice and claims. Once we focus on the bonus-malus coeﬃcient, a clearer positive cor-
relation emerges, pointing to the presence of asymmetric information. The rejection of
conditional independence is not due to false speciﬁcation of the conditional mean of the
risk classiﬁcation equation. Longitudinal data are of considerable help in improving the
precision of the estimates. Finally, we ﬁnd no evidence of any attrition bias.
We now investigate the dynamic link between contract choice and claims, taking into
account experience rating, in order to design a test that will distinguish between adverse
selection and moral hazard.
5 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Let us start with the conditional independence test in (1)
H0 : F(di|xi,n i;θd)=F(di|xi;θd).
Using the law of joint probabilities F(di|xi;θd)=
F(di,ni|xi;θ)
F(ni|xi;θn) , we can write H0 in an
equivalent form
H0 : F(di,n i|xi;θ)=F(di|xi;θd)F(ni|xi;θn)
where θ, θn and θd are some ﬁnite-dimensional parameter vectors.
Indeed, as Chiappori and Salanié (2000) note, we can perform such a test by formu-
lating a bivariate probit of the form
ni = I(x
0
iβn + uni > 0) (3)
di = I(x
0
iβd + udi > 0).
The test focuses on the correlation between uni and udi denoted by ρu.T h et e s tf o r
conditional independence becomes H0 : ρu =0 . Now, let us consider the case where we
17have Ti repeated observations on a contract (assume Ti = T ﬁxed for simplicity). We
can decompose the error term of both equations in (3) into an error component structure
uni = αni + εnit
udi = αdi + εdit.
Assume, for a moment, that the econometrician and both contractual parties can
observe the pair αi =( αni,αdi) where αni may represent speciﬁc policyholder character-
istics, while αdi could represent speciﬁc contract characteristics. The test for asymmetric
information now takes the form
H0 : F(dit,n it|xit,αi;θ)=F(dit|xit,αit;θd)F(nit|xit,αit;θn) ∀t.
Hence, if we again assume normality for (εdit,εnit) we still have a test for residual
contemporary asymmetric information given by testing ρε =0 . Now include the history
of each of the decision variables in the conditioning set such that
H0 : F(dit,n it|xit,d it−1,n it−1,αi;θ)=
F(dit|xit,d it−1,n it−1,αi;θd)F(nit|xit,d it−1,n it−1,αi;θn) ∀t>1.
This still yields a test for residual asymmetric information given by ρε =0 .L o o k i n g
at the marginals, we claim that the cross-sectional variation in contract choice dit−1,
holding αi and nit−1 constant, eﬀectively identiﬁes moral hazard if nit responds positively
to such a variation. Under pure adverse selection, such variation in contract choice
will not lead to a subsequent change in the distribution of claims in the next period.
Therefore, we propose to test for the presence of moral hazard by using Granger causality,
crucially holding αi ﬁxed (Chamberlain, 1984): Rejecting the following null hypothesis,
H0 : F(nit|xit,d it−1,n it−1,αi;θn)=F(nit|xit,n it−1,αi;θn) ∀t>1 (4)
will lead us to conclude that there is evidence of dynamic moral hazard.
One can distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection within this dynamic frame-
work because changes in exogenous risk factors (adverse selection) are controlled over
time. So access to longitudinal data is crucial. Since we do not observe αi and the
cross-sectional variation in dit−1,n it−1, is, by construction, correlated with unobserved
heterogeneity, one additional observation is therefore needed in order to have two pairs
of (nit,d it) and (dit−1,n it−1) from which we can separate the eﬀect of unobserved hetero-
geneity. This is analogous to the identiﬁcation argument Heckman (1981) makes for a
dynamic binary-choice model with an error-component structure. Two remarks should
be made at this point.
18First, we must address the possibility that dit responds to nit+1 and, similarly,
that nit responds to dit+1 .This is a classical diﬃculty in applying Granger causality,
a st h et e s tw o u l dr e v e a lt h ew r o n gc a u s a lm e c h a n i s m s . 16 If one variable responds to
its lead instead of the other variable responding to the lag, then causality is reversed.
However, we would argue that this concern does not apply for testing moral hazard in
the presence of experience rating in France, because of the particular features of the
long-term contractual relationship existing here.
Indeed, this market has been described as one which is characterized by semi-
commitment, because it oﬀers the possibility of renegotiation and switching insurer.
The partial commitment from the part of the insureds implies that there is little incen-
tive for them to choose contracts based on the evolution of future accident outcomes
passed the date when the contract ends (one year) even if they have rational expecta-
tions about accidents. Since they are free to renegotiate the contract without cost the
following year, we can claim that the choice of insurance coverage is not based on claims
forecast two years in advance. We would therefore argue that the Granger causality test
from d to n will indeed serve to detect moral hazard.
The second remark concerns the test for residual instantaneous asymmetric informa-
tion. Even with our use of longitudinal data, the point Chiappori (2000) made concern-
ing the impossibility of separating moral hazard and adverse selection instanteneously
is still valid. It is indeed possible that contract change will, in the very short term,
aﬀect the probability of a claim such that there could be contemporaneous causality
from contract choice to claims and vice versa. This is due to the discrete-time nature
of the data we use. Time cannot serve as a “pseudo-instrument” to identify causality
and one would need external instruments to distinguish one from the other, which may
prove very diﬃcult.17 Therefore the contemporaneous test (ρε) is still one for residual
asymmetric information, although the dynamic moral hazard test does distinguish moral
hazard from adverse selection.
5.1 Parametric Model and Initial Conditions
As we have seen in Table 4, very few annual contracts feature more than one claim.
Therefore, with some abuse of notation, we will deﬁne nit as the occurrence of at least
one claim. We postulate the following parametric model for the evolution of claims and
16See Hamilton (1994, 306-309) for an example where the wrong conclusion about causality is drawn
from a Granger causality test in the presence of rational expectations.
17Because of the discrete choice nature of both variables of interest, there would be an additional
“coherency” problem if both simultaneous eﬀects were present. Coherency is deﬁned as the impossibility
of ﬁnding a unique mapping from (εdit,εnit) to the data for any given value of the parameters. The











itγn + φnnnit−1 + φnddit−1 + αni + εnit > 0).
i =1 ,...,N, t=1 ,..,Ti.
We deﬁne wit to be a set of variables that are predetermined at t such that E(εditwit+s)=
0 and E(εnitwit+s)=0a r ea s s u m e dt oh o l df o rs =0but may not necessarily hold for
s>1. This plausibly allows for feedback from accidents and contract choice to certain
variables such as the bonus-malus and lags in the vehicle’s mileage. The bonus-malus
coeﬃcient has proved to be of particular importance in the conditional independence
tests. Therefore, wit is of the same nature as lags of the dependent variables, given that
wit may also possibly be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity (αni,αdi).
The dynamic test for moral hazard is one for
H0 : φnd ≤ 0 (6)
H1 : φnd > 0
while the contemporaneous test for residual asymmetric information (plausibly again
moral hazard or adverse selection) is given by
H0 : ρε ≤ 0 (7)
H1 : ρε > 0
For a small panel (small T), predetermining a dynamic binary choice with an error-
component structure will lead to the initial condition problem (Heckman, 1981). Since
(αni,αdi) are unobserved we must somehow integrate out unobserved heterogeneity from
the conditional probabilities. Because contracts have a prior history which is hidden for
the econometrician, we need to sort out the joint density of (αni,αdi) and the prior
initial conditions, since di0 and ni0 are missing. Indeed, we need to know how the
diﬀerent (αni,αdi) got sorted out in diﬀerent outcomes, since it is unlikely to be random.
We follow the solution proposed by Wooldridge (2000) and assume the mean of the
distribution of (αni,αdi) to be a linear index y0
i1ζd and y0
i1ζn of endogenous variables
and predetermined variables, yi1 =( di1,n i1,wi1)0.18 The parameters ζn and ζd do
not capture causal eﬀects and therefore cannot be used to test any of the relevant
sources of asymmetric information. They capture both the correlation in unobserved
heterogeneity and the eﬀect of past causal mechanisms, such as the moral hazard prior
18Replacing unobserved heterogeneity by their conditional means yields the following equations re-
20to the observation period. One can note that we do ”lose” one observation in the process.
This is a good illustration of the identiﬁcation issue. Unobserved heterogeneity entails
the use of two repeated observations, conditional on unobserved heterogeneity and recent
history of the variables, in order to test for moral hazard.
5.2 Estimation
If the conditional expectations in (5) were linear in parameters, the two equations could
be estimated separately using ordinary least square, as they contain the same condi-
tioning variables. In essence, this is a reduced-form vector autoregression. However,
since the two equations are non-linear because of the binary nature of the dependent
variables, we estimate them jointly using a bivariate probit with correlated errors. Note
that normality was not rejected in the conditional independence tests. Furthermore, we
allow the errors εnit,εdit to be clustered at the contract level. Finally, we use the same
set of conditioning variables as in the conditional independence tests, as these are crucial
for the contemporaneous test of asymmetric information. We replace (αni,αdi) by their
conditional expectations to take account of initial conditions and take the bonus-malus
and mileage to be the predetermined variables in wi1. Including mileage in lags did not
provide any changes in the results and yielded statistically insigniﬁcant parameters.
Quite naturally, we use the unbalanced panel, although the identiﬁcation of moral
hazard will come primarily from the contracts observed over three years (1049). The
addition of those exiting or entering during the three years (but remaining for 2 years)
may improve the eﬃciency of the estimator. Trivially, those remaining in the panel for
only one year will not be used because of the presence of lagged decisions in the two
equations.
5.3 Results
Estimation results are presented in Table 10. (Complete results are in Appendix B.)




itγd + φdddit−1 + φdnnit−1 + y0
i1ζd + εdit > 0), (8)
nit = I(x0
itβn + w0
itγn + φnnnit−1 + φnddit−1 + y0
i1ζn + εnit > 0).
i =1 ,...,N, t =2 ,..,Ti.
21We ﬁnd evidence that the rejection of conditional independence is entirely derived
from the presence of moral hazard in the contractual relationships that we observe. The
hypothesis of no moral hazard is rejected at the 5% level (t-value=2.02).19 Indeed, we
ﬁnd that those switching from all-risk coverage to third-party coverage tend to exhibit
a 5.9 percentage point decrease in the probability that they will ﬁle a claim the next
year. Therefore, these policyholders try harder to avoid claims when faced with higher
prospective insurance premia.
This change of insurance coverage can itself be triggered by the rising expected cost
of accidents under an all-risk insurance policy. Indeed, those moving from a maximal
bonus of 0.5 because of an at-fault claim in the last year have a 5.8% higher probability
of switching from all-risk coverage to third-party coverage. This eﬀe c ti ss i g n i ﬁcant at
a level of 10% (t-value = 1.73). This can be explained by rising premiums not only due
to ap o s t e r i o r ipricing but potentially also due to ap r i o r ipricing, as many suspect.
Initial conditions also reveal the sorting of contracts along bonus-malus coeﬃcient lines
in initial-year contracts. Those with high bonus-malus coeﬃcients tend to opt for third-
party insurance policies (t-value = 2.20) and also ﬁle fewer claims (not signiﬁcant at
10%).
The second test we proposed is designed to capture residual contemporaneous asym-
metric information. We do not ﬁnd evidence of residual asymmetric information when
looking at the correlation parameter between error terms. This coeﬃcient is low (0.014)
and imprecisely estimated (t-value = 0.25). It is very similar to the one found by Chiap-
pori and Salanié (2000) who were careful to isolate adverse selection from moral hazard
by selecting a sample of drivers who are less likely to be aﬀected by moral hazard. The
test we did in this paper eﬀectively creates a similar setting by using longitudinal data to
replicate conditions in which “moral hazard” stemming from past relationships among
contractual relationships is taken into account.
One last interesting result is that we ﬁnd evidence of a positive contagion eﬀect
(positive state-dependence) in the claim process, which we can distinguish from the
contagion eﬀect created by unobserved heterogeneity in claims. A policyholder ﬁling a
c l a i mi nag i v e ny e a ri s6 . 1 %p o i n tm o r el i k e l yt oﬁle another claim in the next year
as compared to another policyholder with a comparable risk proﬁle (both observed and
unobserved) who did not ﬁle a claim (t-value = 2.55). As suggested by Abbring et al.
(2003a) not ﬁnding a net negative contagion eﬀect does not necessarily imply that moral
hazard is absent under experience rating. Note that, in testing for such an eﬀect, we
control for initial exposure to risk by including mileage among the initial conditions.
19Strictly speaking according to the test in (6), the one sided p-value is 0.021.
226C o n c l u s i o n
Testing for residual asymmetric information in diﬀerent markets is becoming a signiﬁcant
research topic (Dionne and St-Michel, 1991; Fortin and Lanoie, 1992; Genesove, 1993;
Hendel and Lizzeri, 1999; Crocker and Tennyson, 2002; and many others, Chiappori and
Salanié, 2003). The main objective is to verify whether actual stylized contracts derived
from the theory deal eﬃciently with diﬀerent information problems. A more diﬃcult
task is to identify the nature of the diﬀerent information asymmetries. Researchers
usually face an identiﬁcation problem because the same prediction or correlation may
correspond to either ex-ante moral hazard, ex-post moral hazard, or adverse selection in
single period contracting.20
To overcome this identiﬁcation problem, Chiappori (2000) has suggested the use of
multi-period data. Multi-period data seems to be a necessary but not suﬃcient condi-
tion. Indeed, focusing on claims dynamics, Abbring et al. (2003a, 2003b) were not able
to identify any form of moral hazard in the data set obtained from a French insurer. In
this research, we used a unique longitudinal survey of policyholders in France to take
experience rating into account. Indeed, we had access to the dynamic claims as well
as the dynamic contract choices of the policyholders. Having access to contract choices
increased the number of instruments available to isolate moral hazard from adverse selec-
tion. We were able to apply the Granger causality test controlling for the unobservables
(Chamberlain, 1984).
Our results indicate, ﬁrst, that residual asymmetric information is present in our
panel. They also isolate dynamic moral hazard: drivers faced with signiﬁcant increases
in their bonus-malus and premium switch from all-risk coverage to third-party coverage
only (partial insurance) and, improving their safe-driving eﬀorts, signiﬁcantly reduce
their chances of having an accident in the next period.
Our results also indicate that there is no residual contemporaneous asymmetrical
information in the data, when the above dynamic behavior is isolated, conﬁrming the
results of Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001), who did not have
access to multi-period contracts.
The presence of a bonus-malus scheme was crucial to the derivation of our results.
But our results also justify this scheme existence by crediting its introduction for ap-
propriate incentives for road safety. More research on its optimal form or on (improved)
substitutes seems needed to respond to the criticisms directed against it over the last ten
years. It is not clearly apparent also that the industry’s actual form of commitment to
the bonus-malus scheme in France reduces competition among insurers. This issue is im-
20For an analysis of ex-post moral hazard along with ex-ante moral hazard and adverse selection, see
Dionne and Gagné (2002).
23portant because, as shown by Chiappori et al. (2004), market power can itself partially
explain contemporaneous residual correlation between claims and insurance coverage.
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27Panel structure Number of driver-vehicles
status Year 1995 Year 1996 Year 1997
Enter 5443 3464 2901
Exit 3052 3796 -
Remain 2391 2059 -
Total 5443 5855 4960
Table 1: Composition of the SOFRES Survey: Number of
contracts observed in each wave. Exit refers to contracts
that will exit the panel at the end of the year while Enter
refers to contracts which enter the panel (ﬁrst observed)
in a given year. 1049 observations remain in the panel for
the full three years.
28(% and mean) Year 1995 Year 1995
Gender (male) 62.9 Region
Age Paris 33.4
18-24 5.2 North 9.2
25-34 22.3 East 9.8
35-44 21.7 South 35.2
45-54 16.5 West 12.4
55-64 14.7 Occ. drivers 45.2
65+ 20.0 Network
Rural 13.3
SES Position City 40.6
Retired 28.3 Road 46.6
Farmer/Artisan 4.3 Vehicle age
Manager 8.0 Less 3 yrs 34.3
Professional 7.6 3-5 yrs 18.6
Teacher 19.4 5-10 yrs 33.4
Employee 29.1 More 10 yrs 13.7
Student 3.2 Experience (yrs)
# vehicles 1st quartile 14
one 45.8 Median 24
two 45.6 3rd quartile 36
3 and more 8.5 Mean 25.2
# driver-vehicles 5443
Table 2: Contract Characteristics for 1995.
291995 1996 1997
Declared accident (%) 12.6 11.8 10.7
Undeclared accident (%) 7.8 5.5 5.0
Bonus-malus (b) (%)
= 0.5 64.9 65.9 68.3
0.5 < b ≤ 1 33.6 32.9 30.8
1 < b ≤ 1.25 0.9 0.7 0.5
b>1.25 0.6 0.4 0.4
Kilometers (’000) mean 13.75 13.6 13.7
1st quartile 887
3rd quartile 18 17 18
All-risk insurance (%) 69.4 69.9 69.1
# driver-vehicles 5443 5855 4960
Table 3: Accidents, Contract Choice and Utilization
of Vehicle over 1995-1997: Percentage with one claim
or one undeclared accident given. The kilometers are
reported in thousands.
Claims
Coverage None 1 2 34
Third-party coverage 91.5 7.4 0.9 0.2 0.1
All-risk coverage 86.9 11.2 1.6 0.2 0
% of contracts 88.3 10.1 1.4 0.2 0.1
Chi-square test 79.2 (p-value<0.001)
Table 4: Distribution of Claims across Diﬀerent Types
of Contracts 1995-1997: The tabulations (conditional
relative frequencies) are made using all observations
across all years. Similar results emerge for yearly tabu-
lations. The Chi-square test measures the distance be-
tween estimated frequencies and expected cell frequen-
cies under the null hypothesis of independence.
30Claims Undeclared Bonus-malus Kilometers Coverage
Claims -
Undeclared -0.01 -
Bonus-malus 0.08** 0.08** -
Kilometers 0.13** 0.05** 0.12** -
Coverage 0.06** -0.01 -0.14** 0.18** -
Table 5: Correlation Patterns among Variables: Bivariate correlations. **
indicates p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.10.
Point estimates Coverage (di=1if all-risk)
probit (robust SE) Year 1995 Year 1996 Year 1997
With mileage
Claims (ni) 0.080 [1.55] 0.107 [1.82] 0.061 [0.90]
(0.052) (0.058) (0.068)
LogLike -2123.6 -2258.9 -1919.2
Without mileage
Claims (ni) 0.089 [1.74] 0.118 [1.99] 0.072 [1.06]
(0.051) (0.054) (0.068)
Loglike -2126.7 -2268.7 -1930.1
χ2(4) usage (km) 6.22 19.6** 21.8**
# driver-vehicles 5443 5855 4960
Table 6: Cross-Sectional Conditional Independence Tests:
Point estimates along with robust asymptotic standard errors
reported (in parenthesis) and t-values [in brackets]. Estimation
by maximum likelihood probit. Controls for: age dummies (7),
experience splines (4), no presence of occasional drivers, prin-
cipal network used, number of active drivers, income bracket
dummies (9), gender, socio-economic status dummies (8), re-
gion (4), age of vehicle splines (4), type of vehicle (5). Mileage
is included as 4 splines in thousands of kilometers. The same
set of controls is used in all estimations. Complete results in
Appendix A.
31Point estimates Coverage (d =1if all-risk)
probit Year 1995 Year 1996 Year 1997
Without mileage
Claims (n) 0.084 [1.63] 0.119 [2.01] 0.071 [1.03]
(0.052) (0.059) (0.068)
Predicted claims (b n) 2.307 1.793 1.569
(1.037) (1.574) (1.443)
LogLike -2124.3 -2268.1 -1929.4
# driver-vehicles 5443 5855 4960
Table 7: Cross-Sectional Conditional Independence Tests of
Dionne, Gouriéroux, and Vanasse (2001): Point estimates along
with robust asymptotic standard errors reported. Estimation by
maximum likelihood probit.
Point estimates Coverage (d =1if all-risk)
probit Year 1995 Year 1996 Year 1997
Without mileage
Claims (n) 0.097 [1.86] 0.147 [2.49] 0.095 [1.40]
(0.052) (0.059) (0.068)
Predicted claims (b n) 2.509 [2.39] 1.934 [1.23] 1.913 [1.40]
(1.052) (1.583) (1.426)
Bonus-malus = 0.5 0.123 [1.84] 0.277 [4.10] 0.246 [3.28]
(0.067) (0.067) (0.075)
Bonus-malus -0.806 [-4.33] -0.422 [-1.94] -0.514 [-1.98]
(0.185) (0.217) (0.259)
LogLike -2103.4 -2242.9 -1909.5
χ2(2) bonus-malus 41.8 50.4 39.8
# driver-vehicles 5443 5855 4960
Table 8: Cross-Sectional Conditional Independence Tests for the
Presence of Asymmetric Information with Control for the Bonus-
Malus: Point estimates along with robust asymptotic standard errors
reported. Estimation by maximum likelihood probit.
32Point estimates Coverage (d =1if all-risk)
without mileage None Panel Negbin Cr-Sec Negbin
Claims (n) 0.119 [3.46] 0.116 [3.36] 0.114 [3.32]
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Predicted claims (b n) - 4.128 [3.81] 0.658 [1.81]
(1.081) (0.363)
Bonus-malus = 0.5 0.216 [4.70] 0.213 [4.61] 0.217 [4.72]
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Bonus-malus -0.573 [-4.04] -0.597 [-4.14] -0.573 [-4.03]
(0.142) (0.144) (0.142)
LogLike (pooled) -6309.3 -6300.1 -6307.8
χ2(2) bonus-malus 129.4
ρ (% unobserved heterogeneity) 0.918 0.923 0.918
Attrition (bal. vs unb.) χ2(49) 44.78
# driver-vehicles 11,808 11,808 11,808
Table 9: Panel Conditional Independence Tests: Point estimates along with robust
(clustered at the contract level) asymptotic standard errors reported. Estimation by
maximum likelihood probit. The rho estimate comes from an error-component pro-
bit model and represents the share of unobserved heterogeneity in the total variance
of the error time. The second column and third column correspond to estimates
using the Dionne-Gouriéroux-Vanasse (2001) predictor generated by a random ef-
fect negative binomial model (column2) and the pooling of cross-section negative
binomial models (column3). Controls for risk classiﬁcation included.
33Point estimates (1996-97) Dependent variable
t-value in brackets Claims Coverage
Coverage (dit−1) 0.409** 2.464**
[2.02] [10.57]
Claims (nit−1) 0.319** -0.082
[2.55] [-0.51]
Bonus-malus = 0.5 -0.200** 0.202*
[-2.34] [1.73]
Bonus-malus (bit−1) 0.222 0.358
[0.70] [0.71]
Initial condition
Accident out (ni1) 0.137 0.154
[1.10] [0.94]
Coverage (di1) -0.367* 0.576**
[-1.81] [2.43]
Bonus-malus (bi1) -0.149 -0.703**
[-0.53] [2.20]





# driver-vehicles (1996-97) 4450
Table 10: Test for Moral Hazard and Adverse Selec-
tion: Point estimates reported along with t-values
in brackets. Critical level for alpha 0.05 is 1.96 for
two-sided. ** denotes p-values of less than 5 pct, *
less than 10 pct. Robust standard errors are clus-
tered by contract. Controls for risk classiﬁcation
included in both equations. Complete results in Ap-
pendix B.




RE1 Experience spline 0-10 yrs
RE2 Experience spline 10-15 yrs
RE3 Experience spline 15-20 yrs
RE4 Experience spline 20-25 yrs
RE5 Experience spline 25+ yrs
RNR Number of claims
RNT1 Car used on route
RNT2 Car used on city
RNT3 Car used on highway
RBM Bonus-malus coeﬃcient
RBM1 Bonus-malus minimum (0.5)
RD Insurance Coverage (1=all-risk)
RKM1 Mileage spline 0-5000 km
RKM2 Mileage spline 5-10000 km
RKM3 Mileage spline 10-15000 km
RKM4 Mileage spline 15000+ km
RDR Number of active drivers
RU Presence of at least one occasional driver
RINC1-9 Income categories
RCAR Number of cars owned



















RY1 Car age spline 0-5 yrs
RY2 Car age spline 5-10 yrs
RY3 Car age spline 10-15 yrs
RY4 Car age spline 15 yrs
RV1-5 Car group
RG1-5 Car type
RDIE Car runs on diesel
36Cross-Section Conditional Independence Tests (w/km = without kilometers, km = with,
** 5%, * 10%) (Table 6)
Variables 1995 w/km 1996 w/km 1997 w/km 1995 km 1996 km 1997 km
RAGE1 0.004 0.298* 0.522** -0.012 0.276 0.485**
RAGE2 0.013 0.045 0.249** 0.005 0.037 0.231**
RAGE4 0.310** 0.131 -0.068 0.319** 0.144 -0.059
RAGE5 0.283** 0.104 0.120 0.304** 0.132 0.157
RAGE6 0.362** 0.267* 0.218 0.398** 0.323** 0.297*
RE1 -0.005 0.039* 0.057** -0.006 0.037* 0.053**
RE2 0.079** 0.089** 0.079** 0.079** 0.088** 0.079**
RE3 0.036 0.027 0.070** 0.037 0.027 0.069**
RE4 -0.037 -0.005 0.031 -0.039 -0.007 0.032
RE5 -0.021** -0.011* -0.013** -0.206** -0.012** -0.016**
RU -0.030 -0.108** -0.135** -0.024 -0.106** -0.129**
RNT1 0.389** 0.239** 0.150** 0.365** 0.198** 0.094
RNT2 0.022 0.017 0.024 0.017 0.012 0.017
RNT3 0.141** 0.123** 0.123** 0.119** 0.090** 0.088*
RDR 0.022 0.018 -0.053 0.019 0.010 -0.057
RINC1 -0.213* -0.105 -0.024 -0.209* -0.093 -0.035
RINC2 -0.012 0.221* 0.054 -0.007 0.219* 0.047
RINC3 -0.096 0.054 0.141 -0.099 0.054 0.122
RINC4 0.022 0.142** 0.048 0.023 0.142** 0.047
RINC6 0.199** 0.216** 0.266** 0.206** 0.217** 0.262**
RINC7 -0.012 0.163** 0.099 -0.011 0.163** 0.095
RINC8 0.114 0.294** 0.020 0.117 0.295** 0.027
RINC9 0.215** 0.314** 0.209 0.217** 0.312** 0.194
RASEXM -0.176** -0.173** -0.215** -0.192** -0.194** -0.234**
RSES2 -0.151 -0.202 -0.042 -0.144 -0.213 -0.041
RSES3 0.128 0.002 0.086 0.124 -0.009 0.062
RSES4 -0.463** -0.163 -0.269** -0.476** -0.175 -0.282**
RSES5 -0.125 0.005 0.187 -0.137 -0.009 0.153
RSES6 -0.385** -0.233** -0.031 -0.397** -0.252** -0.054
RSES7 -0.156 -0.164 0.183 -0.163 -0.178 0.176
37Variables 1995 w/km 1996 w/km 1997 w/km 1995 km 1996 km 1997 km
RREG2 0.169** 0.106 0.004 0.173** 0.097 0.009
RREG3 0.151* 0.027 0.009 0.152* 0.022 0.016
RREG4 -0.113** -0.024 -0.089 -0.114** -0.023 -0.089*
RREG5 0.009 0.065 0.059 0.003 0.051 0.041
RY1 -0.215** -0.207** -0.186** -0.214** -0.208** -0.189**
RY2 -0.316** -0.305** -0.305** -0.313** -0.301** -0.301**
RY3 -0.076** -0.112** -0.147** -0.069** -0.099** -0.132**
RY4 -0.002 -0.002 0.021 -0.001 0.007 0.026
RV2 0.034 -0.200** -0.011 0.035 -0.200** 0.012
RV3 0.067 0.122** 0.114 0.070 0.124** 0.119*
RV4 0.086 -0.044 0.193** 0.083 -0.046 0.174**
RV5 0.181** 0.027 0.207** 0.178** 0.034 0.183*
RNR 0.089* 0.118** 0.072 0.081 0.107* 0.061
RKM1 . . . -0.004 0.042 -0.008
RKM2 . . . 0.018 0.043** 0.063**
RKM3 . . . 0.017 -0.003 0.005
RKM4 . . . -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
constant 1.499** 0.957** 0.639** 1.471** 0.726** 0.583*
38Appendix B: Complete results for dynamic model of contract and claim















































Lag RD 0.409** 2.466**




R1D (1995) -0.367* 0.576**
R1BM (1995) -0.149 -0.703**
R1NR (1995) 0.137 0.154
R1KM (1995) 0.008** 0.002
constant -1.926** -0.932
Rho 0.014
40